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This research aims to examine the ownership on Islamic economic 
and the ownership stock effect on firm performance and the 
moderating influence of independent commissioner on the 
connection between ownership stock and firm performance. Indicator 
of ownership stock studied was the ownership stock of the president 
director in the company. The firm performance studied by the 
calculation of Price per Earning Ratio. Then, the intended 
independent commissioners are the percentage of independent 
commissioners who are on the company's board of commissioners. 
This research uses qualitaitive method based on Islamic economic 
literature and quantitative methods basedon secondary data. 
Secondary data in this research are the financial report from firms 
that take the floor on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). This 
investigation uses a population that is listed firms on Indonesian 
Sharia Stock Index (ISSI). Subsequently, the sample is filtered using 
purposive sampling techniques with the criteria of listed firms on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange and has the data needed in this 
investigation. As a result, the samples obtained were 296 companies. 
This research uses regression analysis with individual parameter 
significant test (t-test). 
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Hypothesis testing results indicate that Sharia company ownershipis 
in accordance with Islamic economic perspective studies, and 
ownership stock with the indicator of ownership of the president 
director has an impact on firm performance with Price per Earning 
Ratio’s indicator, and independent commissioners based on the 
proportion of independent commissioners on the board of 
commissioners moderate the correlation between ownership stock 
and firm performance. 
 




One of the crucial elements to improve the performance of an organization 
or company is one of them with the right, good, and right corporate governance. 
If good governance implemented in the company, it will also be in line with the 
firm's performance improvement. One of the characteristics of good governance is 
the effectiveness of corporate governance itself, thus it will encourage an increase 
firm's financial performance. Research that has conducted relating to corporate 
governance based on the composition and function of the board of commissioners 
as a driver and supervisor of the company regarding good governance is research 
that can provide additional insight and knowledge to improve and enhance 
corporate governance in economic aspects for developing countries just like in 
Indonesia. 
Agency theory, conveyed by Jensen & Meckling, 1976, is the basis of 
corporate governance development. In this theory, it is defining and interpreting 
the relationship that occurs between an agent (manager) and principal (owner). 
The agent is a party that has a duty as a manager of a company that is given the 
trust and mandate to manage the company as well as possible by the owner of the 
company called the principal. The agent or manager of the company has an 
obligation to the owner of the company or the principal to take responsibility for 
managing the company. 
The manager, as an agent, will be seen as a party who will act in his 
interests by ignoring the interests of the owner of the company. The inequality of 
interests between company owners and company managers will trigger agency 
problems. 
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Jensen & Meckling, 1976, the imbalance of information can lead to two 
problems, including: 
a. Moral Hazard 
Moral Hazard is a problem that will arise when the agent (manager) does 
not carry out a collective agreement that has stated in the employment 
contract with the principal (shareholder). 
b. Adverse selection 
Adverse selection is a condition when the principal cannot understand the 
policies that have been made by the manager (agent) based on information 
that has been obtained or can be due to carelessness in carrying out the 
obligations that have been given. 
Florentina Widita Sari (Sari, 2012) explain good governance is: 
a. The structure of the relationship between the functions of the General 
Meeting of Shareholders (GMOS), Commissioners, Directors, and 
stakeholders; 
b. The Check and Balance mechanism as an authority control over a company's 
internal control; 
c. The rights of shareholders (principals) to company information clearly and 
accurately following the agreed period; and 
d. Disclosure of all information about company ownership, firm performance, 
and stakeholders that is accurate, open, and timely. 
The structure of capital funding contribution is believed to have an impact 
on the company's management, which in turn can also impact on the firm’s 
performance in achieving the firm's objectives to the fullest. It is because there is 
control over the shareholders (principals) (Wahyudi & Pawestri, 2006). Director 
who owns shares (in this study is called the Ownership Stock) refers to the 
potential of management to own leverage or position to pursue their own goals. 
Director who has uncontrolled power by an independent commissioner, is more 
likely to take action in his interests which reduce shareholder wealth (Dunn, 
2004); (Frankforter, Berman, & Jones, 2000).  
The power of ownership reflects the level of economic importance or 
voting rights that an executive has in an organization. Executives are most 
responsible to the owner of the company. Therefore, the highest manager with 
significant ownership will have more power than management who does not have 
stock ownership. The strength of share ownership gives more power and rights in 
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the management meeting room where the company decides matters through 
voting (Larcker & Tayan, 2012).  
Ownership of personal wealth is considered as a motivation to stimulate 
humanity's best efforts to expand the wealth of society. The theory of ownership 
in Islam views personal ownership as unique. Ownership, in essence, is God's 
ownership, while only a part of it, under certain conditions, belongs to man so 
that he can fulfill God's purpose. The intended purpose of God is to represent the 
goals of society by acting as guardians for those in need. 
Personal ownership of the Islamic view is not absolute. Because in Islam 
the provisions of the law are found in certain restrictions and controls that a 
Muslim cannot override in the management and use of his property. So in fact in 
Islam individual ownership is recognized but there are Shariah rules and they must 
represent the wider community. So it is expected that from the possession of 
wealth owned by each individual can provide welfare for the company and also 
the stakeholders. As Allah says: 
"Believe in Allah and His Messenger and give up some of your wealth which 
Allah has given you." (QS. Al-Hadiid: 7) 
Independent commissioners are expected to provide guarantees for the 
creation of financial statements as a whole can interpret and truthfully about the 
company's operations, to prevent the possibilities of fraud by the management 
(Tutut Dwi Andayani, 2010). Mark S. Beasley, 1996, has examined research on 
the proportion of the board of commissioners with financial statement deviations. 
As a result, companies with smaller independent commissioners have a higher 
indication of committing fraud. Research from Nasution & Setiawan, 2007shows 
that earnings management is significantly negatively affected by the proportion of 
independent directors. Commissioners who are not bound are expected to be able 
to reduce cheating practices because they can be more effective and independent 
in overseeing management performance (Parulian, 2004). 
Firm performance analysis can be done with technical analysis methods 
and also fundamental analysis. Technical analysis will use stock price charts every 
day, while fundamental analysis by analyzing performance based on the financial 
statements. In this analysis, there are quite a lot of analysis tools. From many 
analytical tools, a popular analytical tool is the analysis of the ratio of price to net 
profit or called Price per Earning Ratio (PER), investors and potential investors 
can easily conduct stock analysis using this ratio. PER is a financial statement 
analysis tool that included in the market ratio category, and PER is also a 
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measurement tool in determining the value of a company based on mechanisms in 
the capital market. Investors or potential investors can predict the possibility of 
profits generated by the company in the future by using PER analysis. Investors 
can examine the company's financial performance to provide confidence in 
determining the investment to be made. A large PER is an indicator of the 
possibility of company growth, which is also high; on the contrary, a small PER 
shows low company growth (Lusiana & Chabachib, 2010). 
Many variables can influence PER, and evidence from research Mpataa & 
Sartono, 1997; the test results found that PER influenced by several factors, 
including leverage ratio, fixed assets, total sales, profit growth, company scale, 
return on equity (ROE) and dividend payout ratio (DPR). 
Empirical evidence from research on outside independent commissioners 
and company performance is very diverse. Several studies, such as Schellenger, 
Wood, & Tashakori, 1989, and Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 1992, 
prove that the presence of a greater number of independent directors on the board 
of commissioners can make the company's economic performance improve. 
Whereas in another researches (Baysinger & Butler, 1985), (Chaganti, 
Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985), (Rechner & Dalton, 1986), (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991)and(Cho & Kim, 2007) could not find a relationship between composition 
the board in the form of representation from outside independent commissioners 
and firm performance. 
There are various results from researches on corporate governance and firm 
performance. The variety of results that can be caused by the research variables 
used by each researcher also differ (Deni Darmawati, Khomsiyah Khomsiyah, & 
Rika Gelar Rahayu, 2005). Thus, the use of different variables and research 
objects for further research is still very relevant. This research moved from the 
existence of differences in the results of research that had been done and retested 
the moderating variables of independent commissioners on the relationship of 
independent variables of Director ownership (ownership stock) and firm 
performance using Islamic companies as the object of this research. 
This research is a development of Khan & Awan, research, 2012, about the 
effect of board composition on firm performance, by using independent variables 
in the form of an independent board and dependent board composition in all 
companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). This research is also a 
further research development from previous studies using objects of 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia with almost the same variable, namely 
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CEO Power on company performance and the independent board of 
commissioners being a moderating variable. (Noval, 2015). 
Based on the description that has described above, so the main issues that 
will be empirically proven are: 
1) How is the study of Islamic Economics about Ownership in the management 
of an Islamic company? 
2) Does Ownership Stock affect the sharia firm's performance? 
3) Does the independent commissioner moderate the relationship between 
Ownership Stock and Sharia Firm Performance? 
Based on the main problem above, the researcher develops the initial 
hypothesis of the study: 
1) Ownership in Islamic companies in the study of Islamic economics can 
provide welfare to many parties. 
2) Ownership Stock significantly influences the sharia firm’s performance. 
3) Independent commissioners moderate the relationship between Ownership 
Stock and Sharia Firm Performance. 
 
B.  THEORITICAL 
Agency Theory 
The agency relationship is an agreement that is understood and agreed 
upon by the manager (agent) with shareholders/company owners (principal) 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agreement/contract must explain in detail both 
those related to the duties and functions of the manager as the agent, or the 
outline of the company's objectives relating to the management of investment 
funds and the distribution of returns between the manager and the owner of the 
company. The manager is obliged to take responsibility for everything related to 
the management of the company that has been mandated by shareholders (Arifin, 
2005). 
In the relationship between agent and principal, there is a chance of a 
conflict of interest. Managers who have full control over the company's 
operations can implement policies that are not in line with the objectives of the 
owner of the company so that it can encourage the emergence of agency costs. 
The rate of return received by the manager as a party working for shareholders 
will be a cost that must be incurred by the company. 
Refers to agency theory, the experts have the same opinion that when the 
company is more oriented to the interests of shareholders, the company will be 
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managed by minimizing costs to maximize the company's profit rate, so that with 
large profits can provide nominal returns on shares that are also high for 
shareholders. 
Under these conditions, an independent commissioner exists as a structure 
that bridges the interests of agents and principals, an independent commissioner 
can be a fairer supervisor because he is in a position that is not attached to the 
company and the independent commissioner has independence from the influence 
of company managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
Firm Performance 
Firm performance is a reflection of the company's operational and 
financial circumstances, based on firm performance can also be assessed the level 
of the financial health of a company in an accounting period. The assessment and 
analysis of the company's financial situation are carried out using an analysis of its 
financial performance that has been suggested by several experts. 
One of the obligations that must be fulfilled by managers to shareholders 
is to provide a report on the company's financial performance as proof of the 
company's management that has managed by the goals set by the founders of the 
company. Firm performance can be analyzed using many existing analysis tools; 
among them is the market ratio using the Price per Earning Ratio (PER) method. 
This ratio becomes the analysis used in company valuations because this ratio is 
considered as a ratio that can provide assessments that support company 
performance. On the other hand, practitioners and academics believe that each 
firm performance analysis tool has its characteristics, and there are strengths and 
weaknesses so that it cannot fully explain the condition of the company, as well as 
PER. However, PER remains to be excellent in analyzing the market value of a 
stock. 
The information generated from PER explains the nominal amount that 
must be invested to get one rupiah from the company's profit. In another 
explanation, PER can also use as a barometer of the relative prices of stock values 
(Tandelilin, 2010). 
 
Director Ownership (Ownership Stock) 
Director is the holder of the highest position in a company, and director 
referred to in this study is the managing director and will be referred to as 
Ownership Stock. The chief director or also known as the Chief Executive 
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Officer (CEO), is the highest position available in a company that is authorized 
to lead the company and is responsible for the stability of the company. Rezaee, 
2012 Explained that top executives are usually chief executive officers (CEO). 
The managerial function is usually carried out by a management team that also 
consists of other senior executives. 
Ownership is an important source of power (Catherine M. Daily & 
Jonathan L. Johnson, 1997), because ownership binds the wealth of directors and 
shareholders, thus complementing strong performance incentives (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The managing director with substantial ownership is more likely to receive 
a lower salary (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987) and tends not to resist the 
threat of expropriation (Ann K. Buchholtz & Barbara A. Ribbens, 1994). 
However, the Managing Director is vulnerable to selfish bias, so this is considered 
as poor performance externally (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991), President directors 
with strong ownership can maintain their position beyond the point of 
effectiveness (Warren Boeker, 1992). Managing directors who have low numbers 
of ownership are more likely to be removed from the internal coalition (Ocasio, 
1994). 
The way that can be taken to eliminate agency costs is by increasing the 
company's share ownership by managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Policies 
taken by managers may be the effect of the proportion of share ownership of 
company control holders. If the manager has shares in the company that he 
manages, then the manager who also has a role as a shareholder and the position 
will be aligned with the owner of the company, so that it is expected to have a 
good direct impact on the policies adopted by the stakeholders in the company. 
 
Ownership in Islamic Economics 
The study of Ownership in Islamic Economics is widely regulated in the 
Jurisprudence in the fieldsof Al-Mal (property) and Al-Milk (belonging). 
Ownership theory is regulated in Islam to avoid violating someone's right 
(property) by another party, because humans tend to have a materialistic nature. 
Islam recognizes both private and public property rights. Islam also respects 
property rights as well as provides its rules, such as if a person's property rights 
have reached a certain amount must be distributed to others. Islam's respect for 
property rights is clearly reflected in the concept of haq al-adami, besides that the 
protection of the safety of private property is also given by Islam with the 
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determination of criminal sanctions against people who seize it, either through 
theft or robbery. 
Ownership of property is fundamental for every individual in carrying out 
their activities. Ownership boundaries relating to the number, utilization and 
freedom of use are strongly influenced by fundamental teachings, both through 
religious teachings and ideological understanding. In general the boundaries 
discussed are public and private ownership, the use of business objects and the 
maximum limit ofownership. 
Ownership (al-milk) in languagecan be interpreted to have something and 
be able to act freely against it. In general, ownership is understood as a dimension 
of people's mastery of something (goods or objects) and the goods are in their 
hands both in real and legal terms, so that he has the right to use the maccording 
to his wishes and no other person, be it an individual or institution, that can 
prevent obstacles in utilizing the goods. However, from an Islamic point of view it 
does not mean ownership is absolute. The specificity of the Islamic concept of 
ownership lies in the fact that in Islam, the legitimacy of ownership depends on 
morals. 
Islam allows individuals to acquire property, whether moving or not, 
through legitimate means. People can acquire as muchwealth as they can through 
their knowledge, skills, experiences, and efforts. He can gain as much as he can 
with his knowledge, skills, experience, and efforts. 
The existence of ownership rights, a person can act fully in managing the 
object she has. Assets held in the form of a business will be utilized optimally to 
obtain additional assets. In Islam, asset management is expected to provide 
positive and lawful results for the owner of the property and can provide a good 
economic impact for the surrounding area. 
 
C.  METHODOLOGY 
Types of research 
This research is field research, using research data from literature and 
research data in the form of an annual financial report of a Sharia company as a 
research sample. This research examines previous theories to solve problems that 
can occur in a company. For this reason, this research category is non-contrived 
research, because this study does not make artificial arrangements for research, but 
the data used areas are without any specific settings, so the research takes place 
normally in a natural environment as it is. 
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Population and Sample 
The study population uses sharia companies listed on the Indonesia Sharia 
Stock Index (ISSI) on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2018. The sample 
is determined based on the purposive sampling method with the following 
conditions: 
1. Sharia companies examined are listed in the Indonesian Sharia Stock Index 
(ISSI); and 
2. Available data needed for research based on 2018. 
 
Data Types and Sources 
This study uses qualitative data from Islamic economic literature and 
quantitative data in the form of figures obtained from annual financial statements 
of sharia company publications in the Indonesian Sharia Stock Index (ISSI). 
 
Research variable 
1. Firm Performance 
Firm performance becomes the dependent variable; firm performance is a 
reflection of a company's achievements (Maryam, 2018). This research uses 
market ratios as a measurement tool with Price per Earning Ratio (PER) 
indicators in assessing firm performance. PER is the ratio of share price per share 
compared to earnings per share (Suad Husnan, 2008). PER can estimate a 
company's capacity to make a profit. PER is an indicator used by investors as a 
basis for calculating shares to sell when the price per earning ratio is high. 
2. Ownership Stock 
The independent variable used is Ownership Stock. Ownership Stock is an 
important leadership quality and offers many potential benefits for an 
organization. Share ownership by director reflects the capacity of an individual 
who has full authority over the wealth they own and manage. So, it can be 
interpreted Ownership Stock is the capacity of a chief director in exerting their 
power to the policies they want. Ownership Stock can be measured using variables 
that pay attention to the proportion of shares owned by the managing director in 
the company he manages (Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & Donahue, 2007).  
3. Independent Commissioner 
An independent commissioner becomes a moderating variable; an 
independent commissioner is a member of the board of commissioners who is 
obliged to be a supervisor of the company, an independent commissioner is not an 
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employee and is not directly related to the company, and is not part of the 
company owner. The measurement of the independent commissioner variable in 
this study is based on the proportion of independent commissioners from the 
total members of the board of commissioners. 
4. Research Model 
Hypothesis testing uses multiple regression analysis. The development of this 
research model is used to experiment hypothesis 2 "Ownership Stock has a 
positive influence on firm performance" and hypothesis 3 "Independent 
commissioners have a moderating influence on the relationship between 
Ownership Stock on firm performance". The research model is as follows: 
KiPeri = β0 + β1OwnStocki + β2OwnStocki * KomIndi + εi. 
Information: 
KiPeri   : Firm Performance i. 
OwnStocki  : Ownership Stock / Share ownership by directorin the  
                               company i. 
KomIndi  : Proportion of independent Commissioners in the  
                              company i. 
OwnStocki  
* KomIndi                     : Interaction between Ownership Stock and independent  
  commissioners i. 
 
5. Analysis Techniques 
a. Descriptive statistics 
The general explanation of the data examined based on the highest 
value (maximum), lowest (minimum), average (mean), and standard deviation 
(Ghozali, 2016). 
b. Classical Assumption Testing 
1) Multicollinearity Testing 
Multicollinearity testing aims to be able to see whether the 
independent variable has a perfect relationship or near-perfect in the research 
model used. Simple multicollinearity diagnosis based on the value of Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance. If the VIF value <10 or tolerance 
value is more than 0.1, it means that the model is not affected by 
multicollinearity (Ghozali, 2016). 
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2) Heteroscedasticity Testing 
Heteroscedasticity testing to assess variance inequalities in the 
research model from residuals of one monitoring to another. The Glejser 
Test is one of the ways to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity by 
regressing the absolute residual value of the independent variable (Ghozali, 
2016). If it turns out that the independent variable is less than 0.05 or 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, it is an indication of 
heteroscedasticity, even if the independent variable exceeds 0.05 in 
influencing the dependent variable, meaning there is no heteroscedasticity. 
c. Hypothesis test 
1) Coefficient of Determination 
The coefficient of determination (R2) is a tool used to measure the 
capacity of the model in explaining the variations that exist in the dependent 
variable. The range in nominal terms indicated by the coefficient of 
determination ranges from zero to one. A small value (R2) indicates the 
limited competence of independent variables in explaining the variety of 
dependent variables. While the value (R2) is close to number one, it means 
that the independent variable can explain the information needed to project 
variations of the dependent variable. 
2) Significant Testing of Individual Parameters (t-Test) 
Significant Testing of Individual Parameters (t-test) is to see the effect 
of each independent variable in describing the dependent variable. If the 
significance value of the regression results indicates a value of less than 5% or 
0.05, then the independent variable individually influences the dependent 
variable. 
 
D.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Result 
1. Research data 
This research uses data from sharia companies, and the referred sharia 
companies were those listed on the Indonesia Sharia Stock Index (ISSI) in 2018. 
The population of this research is 394 sharia companies. Of the 394 sharia 
companies, as many as 98 sharia companies were incomplete or were outlier data 
or data not following the benchmarks set by researchers. So that 296 Islamic 
companies selected as research samples. 
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a. Research result 
1) Descriptive Analysis Results 
  Descriptive analysis is an analysis that describes the characteristics of the 
research sample in general. Further discussed in table 4.1 illustrates the sample 
description both as a whole and separately according to the sample group. 
Table 1 




















296 .0000 .6647 .010012 .0589202 
KomInd 296 .0000 1.0000 .399575 .1215344 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
296     
Source: Data processed in 2019 
 
Table 1 illustrates the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation 
(level of spread deviations) from this research data. The variables explained are 
firm performance using Price per Earning Ratio (KiPer) indicators, Ownership 
Stock measured by share ownership by director (OwnStock), and independent 
commissioners using a percentage measure of independent commissioners in the 
composition of the board of commissioners (KomInd). 
The table also explains about each variable; the first variable is Price per 
Earning Ratio using the term KiPer has an average value of 23.4216; the lowest 
ratio is -2376,2900; the highest ratio is 3374.5400; the standard deviation is 
259.7554. The mean value shows a figure of 23.4216 means that on average, it 
has a price of 23 times that of net profit. 
The second variable, Ownership Stock, using the term designation, 
OwnStock, shows the result that the average OwnStock in the company is 
0.0100; The lowest OwnStock is 0.0000; The highest OwnStock is 0.6647; 
standard deviation value of 0.0589. The mean value indicates a value of 0.0100, 
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meaning that the Managing Director, who owns shares of sharia companies in 
Indonesia, tends to be still very low. 
In the independent Commissioner variable abbreviated as KomInd, there is 
a mean value of KomInd 0.3995; the maximum value of KomInd 1,0000; 
KomInd minimum value is 0.0000; standard deviation value of 0.1215. The mean 
value of 39.95% indicates that the average of Islamic companies is sufficient at a 
minimum threshold of 30% of the proportion of independent commissioners 
from all board of commissioners. 
2) Classic Assumption Test Results 
a) Multicollinearity Testing Results 
Explanation from Ghozali, 2016, multicollinearity testing was carried out to 
check the research model, which proves the correlation between independent 
variables. The research model considered good if no correlation found 
between the independent variables. The results of testing the research model 
are explained in table 2 as follows: 
Table 2 





1 OwnStock .998 1.002 
KomInd .998 1.002 
a. Dependent Variable: Kiper 
                        Source: Data processed in 2019 
The independent variable test results above explain the tolerance value of 
Ownership Stock (OwnStock) 0.998, which is higher than the standard value of 
0.10 while the VIF is 1.002 lower than the standard value of 10. A variable 
proportion of independent commissioners (KomInd) has a tolerance value of 
0.998, which means higher than 0.10, while the VIF is 1.002 lower than 10. 
b) Heteroscedasticity Testing Results 
Proof of whether or not the similarity of variance occurs from one variable to 
another variable in the research model requires heteroscedasticity testing. 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the value of the residual variance of research 
to other studies is different, whereas if the value is constant, then this means 
there is homoscedasticity. When heteroscedasticity occurs, then the regression 
model is considered not good., so the characteristics of a good regression 
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model are those that do not contain heteroscedasticity (Ghozali, 2016). This 
test uses the Glejser test as a technique used to check for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (Ghozali, 2016). The results of glacier tests that have been 
carried out will be explained in the table below: 
Table 3 








T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Consta
nt) 
-14.200 50.599  -.281 .779 
OwnSto
ck 
233.590 249.085 .055 .938 .349 
KomInd 181.120 120.757 .087 1.500 .135 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsUt 
      Source: Data processed in 2019 
The table explains the variable Ownership Stock (OwnStock) has a 
significance value of 0.349 and the proportion of independent directors 
(KomInd) of 0.135, which means there are no independent variables that affect 
the value of Absolut Ut (AbsUt) as the dependent variable. Evidenced by the 
significance values of the two variables above the value of 0.05. So that the 
conclusion states the research model is free from heteroscedasticity. 
3) Hypothesis Testing Results 
a) Determination Coefficient Test Results 
The coefficient of determination (R2) is a step in checking the capacity of a 
predetermined research model to explain the variations that exist in the use of 
independent variables. The results of the coefficient of determination will be 
in the range of zero (0) to one (1). The greater the capacity of the 
independent variable in explaining the dependent variable, the greater the 
value shown from R2. The reverse also applies, namely, the smaller the 
capacity of the independent variable in explaining the dependent variable, the 
value of R2 will also be small. The results of testing the coefficient of 
determination are in the table below: 
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Tabel 4 
Determination Coefficient Test Results (R2) 
Model Summary 
Mode
l R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
.134a .018 .011 
258.299378
1 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Moderate1, OwnStock 
                  Source: Data processed in 2019 
Table 4 proves that the test results show an adjusted R Square value of 
0.011 (1.1%). Nominal 0.011 obtained shows that 1.1% of firm performance as 
the dependent variable is explained by share ownership by the president director 
in Sharia companies as well as the moderating role of the proportion of 
independent directors. 
b) Significant Test Results of Individual Parameters (t-Test) 
Significant testing of individual parameters (t-test) is carried out to get the 
results about the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable by 
looking at the other independent variables that are constant. T-test results are in 
the following table: 
Tabel 5 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
27.338 15.256  1.792 .074 
OwnStoc
k 
3614.137 1764.497 .820 2.048 .041 
Moderate
1 
-10971.157 5030.011 -.873 -2.181 .030 
a. Dependent Variable: KiPer 
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 Hypothesis 1 
The positive results above (2,048) indicate that ownership in Islamic 
companies can have a positive effect on the company in general and for 
stakeholders in particular. This positive result can also be interpreted that the 
company's management of ownership is well managed. This proves that 
ownership managed with can give a good impact to the surrounding, in 
accordance with the picture in Islamic economic theory. 
 Hypothesis 2 
A significant test results on individual parameters to prove hypothesis 2 is set 
out in table 4.5. T value on the variable Ownership Stock (OwnStock) 2.048 
with a significance value of 0.041. Significance with a value of 0.041 lower 
than the 0.05 standard means that Ownership Stock affects the variable Firm 
Performance (KiPer). The results shown prove that hypothesis 2, which says 
ownership stock affects firm performance, is positively significantly proven 
empirically. 
 Hypothesis 3 
Table 4.5 also shows the t value for the moderating variable percentage of 
independent directors of -2,181 with a significance of 0.030. The significance 
of 0.030 is lower than the standard value of 0.05, proving that there is a 
moderating influence of the independent commissioners on the relationship 
between Ownership Stock and Firm Performance. Thus, hypothesis 3, which 
reads as Independent Commissioner, moderate the relationship between 
Ownership Stock and Firm Performance proved empirically. 
 
b. Discussion 
1) Ownershipon Islamic Economic Perspective 
Ownership is a complicated matter that can cause complications. In Islamic 
economics, every individual has the right to own an item or business, but 
must pay attention to the norms in gaining ownership. In the study of Islamic 
economics too, the assets / businesses needed must be in an object that is not 
approved by the Shari'a, and can also be useful for the owner of the object 
and the parties around it. 
With a well-managed ownership, it will have a positive impact on individuals 
and society, as contained in the theory of ownership in Islam that each 
individual ownership also has an obligation to be able to prosper both 
personally and the community (employees and shareholders). 
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The results of the above study show the same thing with the theory 
presented in Islamic Economics. The company manager, in this case is the 
director, who has ownership rights in the Sharia company that he manages 
can have a positive influence on the company's performance. This positive 
effect on company performance can clearly benefit the company's growth. 
Replace this for investors, shareholders and investors. 
2) Ownership Stock on Firm Performance 
Hypothesis 2 statement that says ownership stock significantly 
influences firm performance empirically proven. These results are seen based 
on the probability value of the significance of Share Ownership with the 
president director shareholding indicator 0.041 lower than 0.05. Descriptive 
analysis results explain the minimum value of ownership stock of 0.0000, the 
maximum value of 0.6647 and the average value of 0.010012 while the 
results of descriptive analysis of firm performance with Price per Earning 
Ratio indicator obtain a minimum value of -2376.29, a maximum value of 
3374.54 and the average value is 23.421635. 
Ownership Stock in Islamic companies in this study is very low, which 
is only 15 companies or 5.07% of the sample, which has an above-average 
Ownership Stock of 0.010012. While 281 Sharia companies or 94.93% 
others have Ownership Stock below the average level of 0.010012. Firm 
performance as indicated by Price per Earning Ratio also has a level of firm 
performance below the average level of Firm Performance that is 23.421635, 
with Islamic companies whose performance levels are above the average of 78 
companies from 296 sample companies, or as many as 26.35% of companies 
have a level of Price per Earning Ratio above the average, while 73.65% or 
218 companies have below-average performance levels. 
The results of testing the hypotheses that prove Ownership Stock has 
value relevance related to firm performance are in line with Combs et al., 
2007 and Sekaredi, 2011. Jensen & Meckling, 1976, also first gave an 
opinion similar to this research, which stated the desire of managers to work 
optimally in manage the company as well as possible to maximize the 
performance of the company will be higher in line with the amount of share 
ownership by the manager. 
3) The Role of Independent Commissioner Moderating Variables in the 
Relationship Between Ownership Stock and Firm Performance 
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The probability value of the significance of the independent 
commissioner's moderating function on the relationship of Ownership Stock 
and firm performance is less than 0.05, which indicates that hypothesis 3, 
which states that an independent commissioner has a moderating influence on 
the relationship between Ownership Stock on Firm Performance is 
empirically proven. The results of the descriptive analysis obtained the 
minimum value of an independent commissioner of 0.0000, the maximum 
value of 1.0000 and an average calculation of 0.399575 then the results of 
the descriptive analysis of company performance revealed a maximum value of 
3374.54, a minimum value of -2376.29, and a value of the average is 
23.421635. 
Independent Commissioners in the companies that became the study 
sample have shown a relatively good proportion, which is 43.58%, or as 
many as 129 Islamic companies have a proportion of independent 
commissioners above the average of 0.3773 of the sample. While the 
remaining 56.42% or 167 companies have a proportion of independent 
commissioners below 23.42% as an average value, however, when viewed 
from existing regulations, namely the board of commissioners must have at 
least 30% independent commissioners from the overall board of 
commissioners, the results show a very good value of 93.92% having a 
percentage of independent commissioners exceeding 30% and only 6.08% 
has still not reached the proportion of 30%. 
Value of Ownership Stock in this research is very low, with only 15 
companies or 5.07% of the sample having Ownership Stock above the 
average of 0.010012. While 94.93% of other companies have share 
ownership values below the average level of 0.010012. The company’s 
performance which is indicated by Price per Earning Ratio also has a level of 
corporate performance is still below the average level of Firm Performance 
that is 23.421635, with details of companies whose level of performance is 
above the average of 78 companies from 296 sample companies, or as much 
as 26.35% of companies still have above-average price per earning ratio, while 
73.65% or 218 companies have below-average performance levels. 
Research that proves the results that the board of commissioners 
moderates the relationship of Ownership Stock and firm performance is 
contrary to the results of research by previous researchers with manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) as research objects 
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(Noval, 2015) which states that an independent board of commissioners does 
not moderate the relationship of CEOs who own shares and the company's 
performance. Bukhori & Rahardja, 2012,  also shows different results, firstly 
using variable company size, total directors, and no significant influence from 
the board of commissioners on the performance of a company. 
Research from Paul, Friday, & Ohiokha Godwin, 2011, which uses the 
variable non-executive external commissioners states that the composition of 
the external board and performance do not have a mutually influential 
relationship and do not have a positive economic impact even though it may 
have several other benefits to the company. 
Independent commissioners do not provide any added value because 
they do not have supervisory positions, lack of adequate qualifications, and 
competencies from independent commissioners (Rashid, Zoysa, Lodh, & 
Rudkin, 2010). Combs et al., 2007 said an external board of commissioners 
was needed to oversee the authority of director, but monitoring by other 
executives provided sufficient constraints on directors with low powers, 
although regulatory trends increasingly supported the board of commissioners 
who were dominated by external parties, findings this research shows that this 
does not always benefit share holders. 
Similar research results have been conducted, namely from Haryono, 
Fitriany, & Eliza Fatima, 2017, which proves that capital structure and 
institutional ownership affect the company's performance variable with the 
indicator used that is ROE. Jackling & Johl, 2009 and Eka Hardikasari, 2011 
states that there is a positive effect resulting from the relationship between the 
size of the board composition on company performance, following the 
opinion that the external environment can increase access to various resources 
which in turn can also improve performance. 
 
E. CONCLUSION   
The purpose of this research is to examine Islamic Economic Perspective 
about Ownership, the effect of the relationship of Ownership Stock on company 
performance variables and to examine the effect of moderation of independent 
commissioners on the relationship of Ownership Stock and company 
performance. Based on the results of the study concluded: 
1. The results of the first hypothesis test show that company ownership in the 
data studied is in line with ownership in an Islamic economic perspective. The 
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results illustrate that ownership can provide prosperity to the company, 
owners, managers and can also attract the interest of potential investors.  
2. The results of testing the second hypothesis between Ownership Stock and 
Sharia Firm Performance show a significant effect. The results of this test 
prove that Ownership Stock affects Sharia Firm Performance. In other words, 
the shareholding of a president director in a Sharia company can influence the 
level of performance of a company. 
3. The results of the third hypothesis test prove that the Independent 
Commissioner moderates the relationship of Ownership Stock and Sharia 
firm performance. It can also mean that the number of independent 
commissioners in a Sharia company can influence the ability of the President 
Director to improve company performance. 
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